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The Lemon in Smith v. Mobile County: 
Protecting Pluralism and General Education* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Victorian days when we could be taught absolute truths 
have vanished forever. Relativism, in its humility, has qualified 
information to the point that it can no longer stand up as truth. 
Neither patriarchal determination or post-modern deconstruc-
tion meets the needs of a pluralistic society desiring to pass on 
values in their fullness. Can education balance its need to teach 
with authority and still respect diversity? 
The answer lies with understanding moral authority in a 
pluralistic society. 1 If this paper is successful in communicating 
the nature of moral authority, the reader will realize: 
That the Lemon test, designed to separate government activity 
from religion, has completely lost its utility. A new method of 
separation must be found. That moral authority is the defining 
element of religion. That the institution of Madison's political 
theory in education, as opposed to the Jeffersonian vision, will 
provide a viable system of general education that doesn't re-
quire a suspension of First Amendment rights. 
A. The Lemon Test 
The Supreme Court developed the Lemon test to protect 
First Amendment rights. The Lemon test requires: 1) a primary 
*. Special thanks go to Dean Cameron who painfully and patiently worked 
through the initial spew, delaying decision until failure was no longer the only option 
I would like to acknowledge Daniel Witte for his footnotes and a common vision. Also, 
thanks to the members of the BYU Journal of Education and Law for the 
uncompensated time and effort they have contributed. 
1. By moral authority I mean the authority to say truth. Moral authority is 
the answer to the question, "Who says?" When a child is taught that the earth is 
round, the authority for the answer is Science. When a child is taught that 
homosexuality is a legitimate alternative lifestyle, the authority for the answer must 
be named, for many obviously disagree. The answer to the question, "Who says" 
distinguishes religions from each other. It also defines different schools of thought; 
see Part V, Section A. 
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secular purpose; 2) a neutral effect; and 3) no entanglement 
between church and state. 2 The courts have had difficulty in 
establishing bright line rules or principles to provide the law 
with consistency. The decisions have been ad hoc; holdings are 
all over the map. Enormous amounts of time, energy, and 
money have been expended in litigating constitutional issues 
regarding what may be taught and done in a public school. "For 
the past forty years, church-state controversies have generated 
a steady stream of educational litigation, and there are no signs 
of diminishing legal activity in this domain."3 Until these re-
sources otherwise expended are made available for the central 
concern of educating, the system will continue to be a political 
and philosophical battle ground rather than a place of sanctu-
ary and learning for children. 
These resources can become available only after constitu-
tional tensions between the rights of parents, children, teach-
ers, and governmental interests have been settled. The consti-
tutional conflict will be resolved if one of two things occurs: 1) 
the United States comes to a genuine consensus as to curricu-
lum, disciplinary standards, and religious influence in educa-
tion; or 2) the State relinquishes its role as the primary server 
of public education. 4 
A genuine consensus has been sought by the courts in order 
to resolve the constitutional tensions inherent in public educa-
tion. Because the Lemon test functions as a consensus locating 
mechanism, it has been applied over the last twenty-six years 
in an attempt to ease the constitutional tensions between par-
ents, children, teachers, and the state. 5 Although the Lemon 
test may have seemed appropriate in its early applications, the 
issues raised in Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm. of Mobile County 
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
3. MARTHA M. MACCARTHY AND NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL 
LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS at 53 (Allyn and Bacon, 3rd ed. 1992). 
4. The possibility of determining consensus is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, this concept fits snugly with the ideas espoused in this paper. For more 
information on consensus in education, see AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 
5-18 (Princeton Univ. Press 1987) (Gutmann proposes that for a theory of education 
to be consistent with democratic government, policy decisions regarding education 
should be the result of democratic consensus (i.e. Congress). Educational practices 
must reconcile competing claims by parents, the state, and individual students. She 
concludes that political majorities should decide educational policy as long as that 
policy is not repressive or discriminatory). 
5. See Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects and 
Humanistic Education, 91 Y.L.J. 1196, 1224 (May, 1982). 
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challenge the very concept of consensus in education.6 By pro-
tecting the least common denominator of religious beliefs, the 
courts dilute the values and beliefs of the preceding genera-
tion.7 
In fact, the Lemon test's inability to deal with the issues 
raised by Mobile County reveals the impossibility of achieving a 
consensus in education in a pluralistic society. Because public 
education contains conflicting constitutional rights, courts are 
left to sacrifice the rights of one party to the benefit of others. 
B. Thesis and Organization of Paper 
Because education inherently teaches through selectivity 
and value preference, content regulation is a regular part of the 
process. Such content regulation violates the First Amendment 
and will continue to do so as long as public education is tied to 
the Constitution. Mobile County, by challenging the very test 
the Supreme Court has used to mitigate the effects of this viola-
tion, reveals the underlying flaw of the current compulsory pub-
lic education system. An analysis of this decision reveals why 
the U.S. government cannot substantively exclude the prolifera-
tion of educational viewpoints and remain true to its own Con-
stitution. 8 
Part II provides some background of public education princi-
ples and case law leading up to Lemon v. Kurtzman. 9 Part III 
illustrates the Supreme Court's inconsistency in applying the 
Lemon test to resolve Establishment Clause violations. Part IV 
takes a closer look at the issues raised in Mobile County. It 
identifies the arguments used by both the district and the cir-
cuit courts in reaching their conclusions. Part V addresses the 
futility of using the Lemon test to resolve the issues raised in 
Mobile County. In addition, Part V explores the two big First 
Amendment questions raised by Mobile County. Questions from 
which the circuit court hid. These questions are: 1) what de-
fines a religious belief? and 2) how can religious beliefs be pro-
tected in education? 
6. 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). 
7. Secular humanism can only teach those widely held beliefs and values 
common to nearly all and/or validated by conventional wisdom. 
8. A voucher system may be the only way preserve a general education system 
without violating the constitution. See Section VI. B. 2. (a). 
9. 405 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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II. PRE-LEMON SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
A. Justifications for Public Education 
[1997 
From the inception of public education, the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson have been cited extensively by scholars and 
the courts in defense of government participation in the field of 
education. Not surprisingly today's educational system is a 
close approximation of his vision. An examination of Jefferson's 
views yields a better understanding of the government's inter-
est and purpose in providing public education. Thomas Jeffer-
son developed and advocated ideas that public education was 
necessary: 1) to provide free education for all; 10 2) to prepare 
the individual for autonomy; 11 and 3) to maintain a free state 
through the (moral and analytic) education of the people. 12 
1. Universal Education 
"The full significance of Jefferson's prescriptions for the ed-
ucation required of a new nation turns on the attainment and 
maintenance of liberty." 13 Both his concern for universal educa-
tion, and his belief that a student should be taught in a way 
that prepares him or her for autonomy are based on the prem-
ise that they increase the liberty and happiness of the people. 14 
Yet for Jefferson, the necessity of education to the maintenance 
of the republic went much deeper. 15 He wrote, "[t]o maintain 
10. ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 262 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1964) 
11. HAROLD HELLENBRAND, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: EDUCATION AND 
POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 9-14 (U. of Del. Press, London and 
Toronto 1990); accord THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Gov. Tyler, May 26'", 1810, 
reprinted in, JOHN C. HENDERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON PUBLIC EDUCATION 
319-320 (N.Y. 1890) (reprinted AMS Ed. 1970) (Jefferson wrote: "I have indeed two 
great measures at heart ... 1. That of general education, to enable every man to 
judge for himself what will secure or endanger his freedom. 2. To divide every 
county into hundreds, of such size that all the children of each will be within a 
central school in it"). 
12. ROBERT HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 14 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1962); see generally, THOMAS JEFFERSON; TOWARD THE GENERAL DIFFUSION 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 
13. JENNINGS L. WAGGONER, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE EDUCATION OF A NEW 
NATION 16, citing Dumas Malone. 
14. HAROLD HELLENBRAND, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: EDUCATION AND 
POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 60 (U. of Del. Press, London and 
Toronto 1990). 
15. ROBERT HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 14 (Yale 
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that a State has not the right to insist upon its youth acquiring 
a certain amount of useful knowledge, would be to maintain a 
doctrine respecting the freedom of the individual will which 
might lead to lawlessness and anarchy. Society has rights and 
responsibilities as truly as have individuals."16 Jefferson bor-
rowed from Montesquieu the perspective that a republic was 
only as stable as society was virtuous. 17 Jefferson, along with 
early pioneers in public education, accepted Montesquieu's as-
sertion that, "the primary aim of republic education is to de-
velop the moral condition of public virtue, whatever that might 
be."IB 
2. Educating for Autonomy 
One of the most influential ideas on Thomas Jefferson was 
the "affectionate pedagogy" of Locke. 19 "Mfectionate pedagogy" 
describes a philosophy whereby the elders selectively filter the 
information and experiences of the student, eventually teaching 
the student methods whereby they could teach themselves and 
effectively filter information on their own.20 This philosophy 
was especially adapted to a culture that believed that by nature 
and by right, people were born to be free. "Parents and mentors 
who wished to educate a charge well and transform him into a 
free agent ... had to know when and how to yield authority to 
the youngster's maturing 'self-critical ability' without utterly 
sacrificing those 'well-defined limits' that child raising for au-
tonomy nevertheless [requires]."21 
Locke had an immense influence on Thomas Jefferson. Jef-
ferson took the idea of educating for autonomy and applied it to 
the establishing of the Republic. For Thomas Jefferson, the 
proper development of the individual for the making of deci-
Univ. Press 1962). 
16. JOHN C. HENDERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON PUBLIC EDUCATION 350 
(N.Y. 1890) (reprinted AMS Ed. 1970). 
17. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The 
Political Ethics of Francis Leiber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339, 350-51 (1992). 
18. Id. at 351. 
19. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 158-162 (John W. and 
Jean S. Yolton eds., Clarendon Press 1989). 
20. HAROLD HELLENBRAND, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: EDUCATION AND 
POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14 (U. of Del. Press, London and 
Toronto 1990). 
21. BLOSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY 133 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford Univ. 1982). 
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sions preserves the freedom of the state. "Mfectionate peda-
gogy" geared the education of the young to achieve an end re-
sult of individual autonomy. For Jefferson that meant the cre-
ation of fully functional patriots in the Republic. The reason 
Jefferson believed the state must educate for autonomy was 
twofold. First, the essence of democratic republic was the oppor-
tunity for free people. Second, the state required men with au-
tonomy sufficient to "judge for himself what would secure or 
endanger his freedom." 22 Educating for autonomy was the prin-
cipal justification for public education because it increased po-
litical equality. Because it increases the individual's influence 
on the democracy, educating for autonomy continues as the pri-
mary purpose in public education. 
3. Education for the State: The Perpetuation of a Democratic 
Form of Government 
The perpetuation of a democratic state rests on the educa-
tion of its children.23 A pioneer of the current public education 
system, E.P. Cubberley, wrote, "all children of the state are 
equally important and are entitled to have the same advan-
tages."24 Because the children in the state are members of the 
state, the Constitution requires that the basic rights of children 
be upheld. 25 In his opinion for Wisconsin v. Yoder, Chief Justice 
Burger wrote, "providing public schools ranks at the very apex 
of the function of a State."26 
The State's interest in public education extends beyond its 
own preservation to the protection of its children. Although nat-
ural parents may have a stronger emotional bond, the state has 
clearly asserted a legal supremacy capable of pre-empting pa-
rental responsibility for the sake of the child. For example, chil-
dren of fanatics and extremists can be taken by the state. 
"These children, solely because of their parents' beliefs, do not 
receive the same legal protections from harm, (for instance, in-
22. ROBERT HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 178 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1962). 
23. In addition, the level of education children obtain will determine the degree 
of freedom of which a particular democracy is capable. 
24. E.P. CUBBERLEY, SCHOOL FUNDS AND THEIR APPORTIONMENT 18 (Teachers 
College: Columbia Univ. Press 1905). 
25. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist. No. 21., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
26. 406 U.S. 205, 213. 
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ferior health care and an inferior education) that other groups 
of children receive.'>27 Who is to protect them if not the state? 
Some, possibly witnesses to poor parenting, believe that short 
of taking the children from their parents, compulsory education 
is the most effective method society has of providing children 
with equal protection and opportunity in this life. However, the 
Court has recognized in Parham v. J.R. et al. No. 75-1690 the 
American distaste for an education system that trumps paren-
tal authority. 28 
The basic arguments for more centralized state control of 
curriculum return us to the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. 
These arguments include giving all children an equal start, pro-
tecting their constitutional rights, and insuring the state's sur-
vival as a democracy. 29 
B. Constitutional Challenges in Public Education 
"From colonial days until the mid-twentieth century, reli-
gious (primarily Protestant) materials and observances were 
prevalent in many public schools."30 On the other hand, sectar-
ian schools received government funding throughout the nine-
teenth century.31 Early in the twentieth century the widespread 
movement for compulsory education began in an effort to pro-
vide equal opportunity to all children. From its inception, how-
ever, that goal and the process for achieving that goal have 
been challenged through extensive litigation. The system con-
tinues to experience difficulty in balancing the conflicting inter-
27. JAMES G. DWYER, "The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child 
Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious 
Objectors," 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1321 (1996). 
28. Parham v. J.R. et al. No. 75-1690 (1979) (The statist notion that 
governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some 
parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition). 
29. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) (observing that "the 
importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as 
citizens has long been recognized"); See also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 681-83 (1986) (describing one objective of education as "the inculcation of 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic system"). 
30. MACCARTHY AND CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 3, at 28. 
31. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 103-104 (1985) ("As the United States moved 
from the 18th into the 19th century, Congress appropriated time and again public 
moneys in support of sectarian Indian education carried on by religious 
organizations .... It was not until 1897, when aid to sectarian education for Indians 
had reached $500,000 annually, that Congress decided thereafter to cease 
appropriating money for education in sectarian schools."; See Act of June 7, 1897, 30 
Stat. 62, 79; cf. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 77-79(1908). 
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ests involved, those being the interests of the State and the con-
stitutional rights of parents, teachers, and students, seemingly 
unaware of the company with which it is thrown by its suspen-
sion of constitutional rights. 
1. Establishment Clause Violations 
Justice Jackson comments in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. u. 
Barnette on applying Establishment Clause interpretation to 
opinions of politics, nationalism, and religion. 32 Mter Barnette, 
because someone did not believe in flags, no one could be re-
quired to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance. 
Deeply held beliefs could no longer be practiced or exercised at 
school because they conflicted with other deeply held beliefs. 
In Everson u. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp., the Supreme Court 
relaxed its interpretatim of the Establishment Clause, allowing 
funds to be used for the reimbursement of the costs of bussing 
children bussed to parochial schools.33 However, by 1954, the 
Supreme Court was interpreting the establishment clause to 
mean that "a wall of separation between church and state" 
should be built. 34 Oblivious to the fundamental connection be-
tween religion and education, the court began the process of 
purging from education its very soul. 
The Supreme Court continued building on that wall of sepa-
ration with its creation of the Lemon test. The Lemon test has 
been followed or used with slight modifications for twenty-six 
years to determine Establishment Clause violations.35 Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court has not achieved consistency within 
the walls of its own court, sometimes deciding Establishment 
Clause cases without even using the Lemon test. 36 The 1985 
Supreme Court decision in Wallace u. Jaffree kept the Lemon 
test alive by using it to strike down statutes that permitted 
time for students to pray. 
32. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
33. 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
34. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
35. The Lemon test requires: 1) primary secular purpose; 2) a minimal secular 
effect; and 3) no entanglement between church and state. 
36. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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2. Free Exercise claims 
Pre-Lemon decisions have followed a trend of shifting re-
sponsibility for the child's education from the parent to the 
state. In 1925, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon stat-
ute that required children from age eight to sixteen to attend 
public schools. The Court wrote, "The child is not the mere 
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his des-
tiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare him for additional obligations."37 
By 1972, the Court's view of who retained ultimate respon-
sibility to educate the child had clearly shifted. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder illustrates well the difficulties the courts face in balanc-
ing the various interests. 38 In this case, the Supreme Court had 
to determine whether Amish youth would be compelled to at-
tend public schools even though it violated their religious be-
liefs. Because the Amish have a history of good behavior, the 
courts allowed them their own autonomy. The Court held, "A 
State's interest in universal education however highly we rank 
it is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges 
on fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the tra-
ditional interest in parents with respect to the religious up-
bringing of their children."39 The Court has shifted responsibil-
ity for the education of its children from the parents to the 
state.40 In 1925, parents had "the right coupled with the high 
duty."41 Now, the state is mostly, but "not totally[,] free from a 
balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights."42 
The simple conclusion derived from Yoder is that parents do 
not have the right to determine whether their children are edu-
cated, but they do have some control over where such education 
takes place.43 The degree of control a family can exercise is de-
termined largely by their wealth. Those parents who cannot 
afford a school of their choice are thus given a chance to choose 
37. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
38. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
39. Id. at 214. 
40. See Comment, "People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a 
Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment," 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183 
(vol. 1). 
41. Yoder, at 233. 
42. Id. at 214. 
43. Id. at 211-212. 
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between home-schooling or submitting to state-determined cur-
riculum and standards. 44 State-determined morality continues 
to be in a state of flux. Though the courts are reluctant to define 
religion, the Court has, through the use of the Lemon test, cre-
ated a situation where it must determine what constitutes a 
bona fide religious belief. 
Ill. THE LEMON TEST 
The Lemon test has been defined and refined by many 
cases. It has been favored then disfavored, twisted, sweetened, 
and abandoned by the Supreme Court.45 However, it remains 
the law for lower courts. 
A. Lemon v. Kurtzman 
The Supreme Court continued building its "wall of separa-
tion" between church and state with its 1970 articulation in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 46 Since then, the Lemon test has been fol-
lowed or used with slight modifications for twenty-six years in 
determining constitutional violations. 47 
1. Secular teachers in sectarian schools 
When Rhode Island instituted a program which provided 
salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic 
schools, the Supreme Court ruled that such statutes operated to 
the benefit of parochial schools. This case exposed the difficulty 
in determining Establishment Clause violations solely by 
whether the benefit went to a sectarian or a secular organiza-
tion. In providing a more objective decision, the Court devel-
oped a three prong test that would determine constitutionality 
on a more pragmatic level. This test was designed to thwart the 
specific harms that occur when First Amendment rights are 
violated rather than enforcing the principle of pure separa-
tion.48 By combining the cumulative criteria developed by the 
44. Seventeen states have still not authorized home-schooling, thus holding the 
less affluent hostage to state-determined morality. 
45. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
46. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
47. Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(advocating another modification). 
48. Lemon, at 612. 
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court over many years, the Supreme Court settled upon a form 
of analysis which is now known as the Lemon test. 49 The three 
prongs the Court "gleaned from [its] cases" require that in order 
for a statute to be constitutional, it must have: 1) a primary 
secular purpose; 2) a neutral effect; and 3) no excessive entan-
glement between church and state. 50 
In other words, for a statute to be constitutional, it must be 
drafted to solve a secular problem. The consequences that come 
as a result of the statute must be neutral as to sectarian inter-
ests. Finally, the no excessive entanglement between church 
and state prong ensures that even if the statute is for a primary 
secular purpose and has a neutral effect, the statute will not 
put people in a position where their activities or decisions could 
affect a sectarian organization or group. In Lemon, two statutes 
which provided for the payment of secular teaching in private 
schools were struck down under the excessive entanglement 
requirement of the third prong. 
B. The Living Dead 
The Lemon test has undergone a confused refining during 
its twenty-six year existence. It has been used, then not used, 
then used again, then cast aside. 
1. Dead in 1984 
In Lynch v. Donnely, "The city of Pawtucket, R.I. annually 
erect[ed] a Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit 
organization and located in the heart of the city's shopping dis-
trict."51 The district court held that although the display had an 
important secular purpose, it could not pass the third prong of 
the Lemon test. 52 In other words, the display had a religious 
effect. When the circuit court affirmed the injunction, it held 
the display did not have a secular purpose.53 Both the district 
court and the circuit court applied the Lemon test to resolve 
Establishment Clause violations. The Supreme Court in Lynch, 
however, asserted that the purpose of the Lemon test is "to pre-
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 612-13. 
51. 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984). 
52. Donnely v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1168 (1981). 
53. Donnely v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1032 (1982). 
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vent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the church or 
the state] into the precincts of the other."54 At the same time, 
however, the Court has recognized that "total separation is not 
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between gov-
ernment and religious organizations is inevitable."55 Because 
the Lemon test creates a "blurred, indistinct, and variable bar-
rier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
ship," the Court in Lynch declined to use it in coming to their 
conclusion. 56 The Lemon test had apparently already been 
abandoned by the Supreme Court as the legal test. 57 Once 
again, the Court had relegated the Lemon test back to its role 
as "no more than a helpful signpost" in dealing with Establish-
ment Clause challenges. 58 
2. Alive in 1985 
The Supreme Court decision in Wallace v. Jaffree kept the 
Lemon test alive by striking down statutes that permitted time 
for students to pray. 59 In Jaffree, the state drafted three stat-
utes, each with slightly more religiosity, to test the limits of the 
Lemon test. Determining the difference between religious and 
secular silence proved to be a difficult thing for the court.60 
54. Lynch, at 672, citing Lemon, at 614. 
55. Id. 
56. Lemon, at 614. 
57. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (non-use of the Lemon test to 
resolve Establishment Clause case). 
58. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229, 265-66 (1977); accord Marsh v. Chamber, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
59. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
60. Separating the secular from the religious can be a very fine line. For 
example, in Allegheny v. A.C.L.U. Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) the 
Supreme Court used the Lemon test to distinguish which parts of a Christmas 
display were permissible. The Court determined that the display of creche in the city 
violated the establishment clause. However a menorah and a Christmas tree next to 
each other did not violate the establishment clause. The Court felt that the menorah 
and the Christmas tree had achieved a sufficient cleansing from being purely religious 
symbols and therefore had secular value. Clearly, the separation point delineated by 
such an application of the Lemon test is not determined by the meaning of the object 
or activity, but by society's commercial use of the object or activity. This case is also 
an illustration of the fact that the Lemon test has been utilized in resolving 
establishment and free exercise clause conflicts beyond the limited scope of public 
education. 
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3. Dead in 1992 
In Lee u. Weisman, parents, administrators, and local clergy 
came together to develop a "nonsectarian" prayer.61 These citi-
zens, once again of Rhode Island, tried to comply with the 
court's interpretations and application of the Lemon test with-
out giving up personal values and beliefs. The school went to 
great lengths to provide a prayer at graduation which did not 
violate the separation of church and state. The Supreme Court, 
however, wisely held "that [the] school could not provide for 
'nonsectarian' prayer to be given by clergyman selected by the 
school."62 A prayer that must pass a government standard or 
test, even a good faith effort to accommodate, lacks the consti-
tutional protection of the First Amendment. The First Amend-
ment was designed to protect an individual's right to worship 
after the dictates of one's own conscience. A prayer designed so 
generically as to offend no one, has little chance of appeasing 
the God of someone. 
The Court in Lee u. Weisman elected to not use the Lemon 
test in reaching its conclusion on this issue.63 Instead, the Court 
balanced the interests based on accommodation and coercion 
principles. The Court ruled that the accommodation principle 
does not "supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by 
the Establishment Clause, which guarantees at a minimum 
that a government may not coerce anyone to support or partici-
pate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so.' ,64 
4. Alive in 1993 
Lamb's Chapel u. Center Moriches Union Free School Dis-
trict provides another instance of deep judicial differences re-
garding the use of the Lemon test. 65 Justice Kennedy refused to 
be "diverted by Justice Scalia's evening at the cinema."66 Never-
theless, he affirmed the validity of the Lemon test in Lamb's 
61. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
62. !d. 
63. Id. at 577. 
64. !d. citing Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 686-88 (1984). 
65. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
66. !d. at 395, note 7. 
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Chapel, writing, "we return to the reality that there is a proper 
way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however 
frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled."67 For 
his part, Justice Scalia wrote the following: 
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some 
ghoul in a late- night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in 
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed 
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence once again, frightening the little children and school 
attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. Its 
most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully 
six feet under: Our decision in Lee v. Weisman, conspicuously 
avoided using the supposed "test" but also declined the invita-
tion to repudiate it. Over the years, however, no fewer than 
five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opin-
ions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart 
(the author of today's opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has 
joined an opinion doing so ... The secret of the Lemon test's 
survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare 
us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can 
command it to return to the tomb at will. When we wish to 
strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it, when we wish 
to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely, Some-
times, we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no 
more than helpful signposts," Such a docile and useful mon-
ster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; 
one never knows when one might need him. For my part, I 
agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have 
criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment 
Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes its in-
termittent use has produced.68 
5. Dead in 1994 
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District 
v. Grumet, the Court went to lengths to avoid basing its deci-
sion on the Lemon test. 69 In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Blackmun wrote to "note [his] disagreement with any sugges-
tion that today's decision signals a departure from the princi-
67. Id. 
68. ld. at 398-400. 
69. 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
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ples described in Lemon v. Kurtzman"70 He continued, "Indeed, 
the two principles on which the opinion bases its conclusion 
that the legislative act is constitutionally invalid essentially are 
the second and third Lemon criteria.'m Though the Lemon test 
has not yet been expressly overruled, one must wonder just how 
alive it is when the Court refuses to use the Lemon test by 
name, even when the Court uses Lemon test principles. 
6. Alive in 1996 
A New Jersey school district, seeking to preserve the right 
of students to pray at graduation, instituted a policy whereby 
the students could choose whether or not a prayer would be in-
cluded at graduation. The Third Circuit Court concluded in 
American Civil Liberties Union. of New Jersey u. Black Horse 
Pike Regional Board of Education that the Lemon test pre-
cluded a majority from using state machinery to impose a reli-
gious act on a minority. 72 The Court noted that, "[t]he Lemon 
test has been the subject of critical debate in recent years, and 
its continuing vitality has been called into question by members 
of the Supreme Court and by its noticeable absence from the 
analysis in some of the Court's recent decisions." 73 But the court 
followed the Lemon test. The Court acknowledged that, "never-
theless, Lemon remains the law of the land, and we are obli-
gated to consider it until instructed otherwise by a majority of 
the Supreme Court."74 
7. Summary 
The Court's recent inconsistency in following the Lemon test 
implicates the judiciary in its "outcome determinative" behav-
ior.75 Clearly, the Lemon test embodies no principle of actual 
separation of church and state. Rather, it is a "useful tool" for 
minimizing the effects of First Amendment violations. 76 
70. Id. at 700. 
71. Id. 
72. 84 F.3d 1471 (1996). 
73. Id. at 1484. 
74. Id. 
75. Interview with Daniel Witte, Author of "People v. Bennett: Analytic 
Approaches to Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth 
Amendment," in Provo, UT. (Mar. 28, 1997). 
76. Recall Justice Scalia's remarks, see supra, note 68 and accompanying text. 
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Although religious fundamentalists may rejoice at the set-
ting aside of the Lemon test in favor of principles of accommo-
dation and coercion, the prospect of losing the influence of the 
Lemon test in public education has alarmed others. Julian 
Kossow expressed dismay at the prospect of losing the effect of 
separation attempted by the Lemon test, fearing that in the 
absence of the Lemon test, fundamentalist beliefs will be forced 
upon the populace. 77 He writes, "The Rehnquist Court's thrust 
toward accommodation of religion is simply too threatening to 
the millions of Americans who do not follow the majority's 
creed. The wall of separation ... may crumble under the weight 
of too many decisions like Bowen, Zobrest, and Rosenberger."78 
Fundamentalists, on the other hand, look forward to the possi-
bility of being free, once again, to pray at school. 
Whether the Lemon test lives or dies, it has existed to mini-
mize the infringement on freedom of conscience, for the nature 
of public education is to "foist beliefs upon Americans of differ-
ent faiths." 79 This holds true whether it be athiests offended by 
the praying of others, or fundamentalists offended by the ab-
sence of prayer. Conservatives and liberals alike should be put 
on the alert by such disregard for the process by which First 
Amendment freedoms are preserved. The efforts by the Court to 
minimize the effects of the First Amendment violations in pub-
lic education would be commendable, had the Lemon test not 
become the Court's tool for preserving public education and its 
suspension of First Amendment rights. 
C. Mixing Establishment and Free Exercise Clause Violations 
in Public Education 
Because parents' claims against public education can be 
based on either Establishment or Free Exercise Clause Viola-
tions, they have sometimes been further reclassified. Jane A. 
van Galen identifies "home schoolers as either pedagogues or 
ideologues."80 Pedagogues evolved when "disaffection developed 
77. JULIAN R. Kossow, Preaching to the Public School Choir: The Establishment 
Clause; Rachel Bauchman, and the Search for the Elusive Bright Line, 24 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 79, 104-5 (1996). 
78. ld. 
79. ld. 
80. Doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina, 4 7 Dissertation Abstracts 
International 1683-A (November, 1986). 
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during the late 1960s with schools as rigid, authoritarian, bu-
reaucratic institutions [that were] unable to provide effective 
learning experiences for children."81 Ideologues believe that 
"schools do not give enough attention to traditional subject mat-
ter and are concerned that the schools promote values and be-
liefs that are not consistent with their religious doctrine and 
political and social perspectives."82 
Either motive should be sufficient grounds for escaping pub-
lic schools. Parents clearly have an interest in teaching their 
children values and in procuring for their child the best possible 
opportunities this life has to afford. If public education substan-
tively violates either clause alone, the state's interest in educa-
tion could more easily prevail. Parents with insufficient time or 
money cannot get their child away from the offending material 
at a public school, and they cannot get the offending material 
changed. In Edward v. Aguillard, the Supreme Court wrote, 
Students [in the public schools] are impressionable and their 
attendance is involuntary. The State exerts great authority 
and coercive power through mandatory attendance require-
ments, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as 
role models and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure. 
[sic] Furthermore, the public school is at once the symbol of 
our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting 
our common destiny.83 
The curious mix of Establishment Clause violations and 
Free Exercise violations, occurring in public education in those 
cases that have parents who fundamentally disagree with cur-
riculum or environment, presents the most severe threat to the 
First Amendment rights of parents. This threat is the subject of 
Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County. 84 
81. STEPHEN G. GILLES, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996). 
82. ld. 
83. 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). 
84. 827 F.2d 684 (ll'h Cir. 1987). 
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IV. SMITH V. BD. OF SCH. COMM'RS OF MOBILE COUNTY 
A. The Facts 
1. Procedural history 
Alabama, seeking to allow its students to begin each school 
day with a prayer, passed three slightly different statutes, each 
permitting just a little more worship than the one before it.85 By 
determining just how much prayer would be permitted, Ala-
bama sought to secure as much freedom to pray as the Courts 
would possibly allow. Ishmael Jaffree brought a suit seeking a 
declaratory judgment that classroom prayer activities con-
ducted in the Mobile public school system violated the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. In addition, he 
sought an injunction against classroom prayer.86 
When Douglas T. Smith and others filed a motion to inter-
vene in the Jaffree action alleging an injunction against reli-
gious activity in the public schools would violate their right to 
free exercise of religion, the district court allowed them in as 
defendants. Subsequently, the appellees filed a request for al-
ternate relief. If Jaffree won on his injunction against prayer, 
Mr. Smith and the State of Alabama requested that an injunc-
tion be enforced "against the religions of secularism, human-
ism, evolutionism, materialism, agnosticism, atheism, and oth-
ers."87 
The district court summarily determined that Jaffree was 
not entitled to relief because the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment did not prohibit states from establishing a 
religion.88 The Eleventh Circuit swiftly overruled this decision 
in Jaffree v. Wallace. 89 Whereupon the district court addressed 
the two tougher issues it had bypassed in its first attempt. The 
first issue was whether teachers and students had free speech 
rights that protected their prayers in a public school. The sec-
ond issue was whether teaching the religion of secular human-
ism in public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. 
85. ALA. CODE ANN.§§ 16-1-20.1; 16-1-20.2; and 16-1-20.3 (1982). 
86. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983). Aff'd 
in part, reu'd in part sub nom. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 1128. 
89. 705 F.2d 1526 (11'h Cir. 1983), cert denied sub nom. 
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2. Issues addressed 
The district court entered a consent decree by Governor 
Wallace and the Mobile County Board of School Commissioners 
in favor of the appellees.90 At a bench trial the appellees' evi-
dence focused on various textbooks which unconstitutionally 
established the religion of secular humanism. The district court 
found that forty-four of these textbooks violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment. The court then perma-
nently enjoined the use of them in Alabama public schools. 
The principal issue addressed by the circuit court was 
whether the use of purely secular textbooks in Alabama public 
schools constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause by 
advancing secular humanism or by inhibiting theistic religion. 
Two important issues were not addressed by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court: 1) whether secular humanism is a religion (i.e., 
what defines a religious belief), and 2) whether religious beliefs 
can be protected in public education. These issue will be ad-
dressed in Parts V and VI of this paper. 
B. The Court's Analysis 
The Eleventh Circuit Court began each section of its analy-
sis with a short description of how the district court ruled. Di-
rectly after describing the district court's ruling, the circuit 
court set out its own finding on which law to apply to the facts. 
For example, the first paragraph stated, "The district court 
found that secular humanism constitutes a religion within the 
meaning of the First Amendment."91 The circuit court then 
noted that not even the Supreme Court had established a com-
prehensive test for determining what constitutes a religious 
belief for the purposes of the First Amendment and that the 
circuit court need not do so at this time. The circuit court first 
decided what test to apply in determining whether the plain-
tiff's First Amendment rights were being violated. It then ap-
plied that test to the home education textbooks and to the his-
tory and social studies textbooks. 
90. Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F.Supp. 939, 988 (S.D. Ala. 1987). 
91. Mobile County, at 689. 
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1. The test 
The circuit court chose the Lemon test. 92 The Lemon test 
had the most judicial weight in determining whether govern-
ment was neutral toward religion in a particular activity.93 In 
addition, the court asserted that the Lemon test was "objec-
tive."94 In determining which test to use, the circuit court as-
serted that it need not attempt the formation of a legal defini-
tion of religion.95 However, it did treat secular humanism as if 
it were a religion for the purpose of deciding this case. The 
court focused on the second prong of the Lemon test, because 
the parties agreed that there was no question that the books 
had a secular purpose or that there was excessive government 
entanglement. 
2. Home Economics textbooks 
The district court determined that students were required 
to accept as true certain tenets of humanistic psychology. 96 This 
finding was based on the fact that the books assumed that self-
actualization was the goal of every human being. The district 
court ruled that such a "relativistic and individualistic ap-
proach constituted the promotion of a fundamental faith claim 
when only the temporal results of a man's actions could be re-
garded in determining the morality of an action."97 According to 
the district court, "[t]his belief strikes at the heart of many the-
istic religions' beliefs that certain actions are in and of them-
selves immoral, whatever the consequences, and that, in addi-
tion, actions will have extra-temporal consequences."98 
The circuit court cleverly used the accommodationist princi-
ple outlined in Lynch to overcome the factual similarity be-
92. The Lemon test states: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion ... ; finally the statute must not foster 'an excessive government 
entanglement with religion."' Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) citing 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (citations omitted) (Governmental 
action violates the establishment clause if it fails to meet any of these three criteria). 
93. Mobile County, at 689. 
94. Jaffree, at 56, n. 42 "The effect prong [of the Lemon test] asks whether, 
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys 
a message of endorsement or disapproval." 
95. ld. 
96. Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 951-58 (S.D. Ala. 1987). 
97. ld. at 986-87. 
98. ld. at 987. 
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tween the textbooks and tenets of secular humanism.99 The 
principle of accommodation, stated simply, "affirmatively man-
dates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and 
forbids hostility towards any." 100 The circuit court determined 
that the government's duty to accommodate religion was not 
overcome by the fact that the teachings of the textbooks coin-
cided with tenets of secular humanism. 101 Therefore, unless the 
government's actions amounted to an endorsement of a particu-
lar religion, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
was not violated. 102 The circuit court concluded that the govern-
ment's attempt to inculcate the children with good values, hab-
its and independent thought "was an entirely appropriate secu-
lar effect," and a fundamental objective of public education. 103 
3. History and Social Studies textbooks 
Although the factual complaints concerning the history and 
social studies textbooks were different, the circuit court dis-
missed them by relying on the same underlying premise, the 
second prong of the Lemon test. Because the textbooks effec-
tively removed any mention of the religious influences on Amer-
ican history, the district court found that the textbooks pro-
moted secular humanism. 104 Once again, the circuit court found 
that the coinciding of religion (in this case secular humanism) 
with the secular teachings of the government in public educa-
tion did not offend the second prong of the Lemon test. The 
court found that the primary purpose of the textbook was secu-
lar. The circuit court ruled that the message conveyed by the 
choice of a particular text over another was one of quality, rele-
vance, or other nonreligious reasons as opposed to one of en-
dorsement of a religion. 105 
99. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672. (holding that the government has a duty to 
accommodate religious beliefs and practices where they don't infringe on third 
parties). 
100. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672. 
101. Ball, 473 U.S. at 393; accord Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771; accord Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980); See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 682. 
102. !d. at 681. 
103. Citing Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 692-93 (1986) 
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). 
104. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (ll'h Cir. 1983). 
105. Mobile County, 827 F.2d at 693-94; Cf. Board of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
880 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("School officials must be able to choose one 
book over another, without outside interference, when the first book is deemed more 
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The circuit court concluded by distinguishing Epperson u. 
Arkansas on which the district court had relied. 106 In Epperson 
u. Arkansas, a statute forbidding the teaching of evolution was 
ruled unconstitutional. The district court ruled that omission of 
material based on religious content constituted a First Amend-
ment violation. The circuit court noted that, "selecting a text-
book that omits a particular topic for nonreligious reasons is 
significantly different from requiring the omission of material 
because it conflicts with a particular religious belief."107 The 
circuit court continued its emphasis of the second prong of the 
Lemon test in debunking this argument. Because the books had 
a secular purpose, they in no way violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE LEMON TEST AND ITS UNDERLYING LEGAL 
THEORY 
As background for understanding the flaws of the court's 
analysis in Mobile County, Part V discusses the important issue 
sidestepped by the Eleventh Circuit; namely, what defines a 
religious belief. Section A provides a definition of religious be-
lief. Section B then illustrates how this definition exposes the 
flaws in the court's analysis of the Lemon test. 
A Moral Authority: Defining Religious Belief 
This section lays out the underlying principles alluded to in 
my critique of Lemon u. Kurtzman. They provide the foundation 
for the forthcoming solution to the paradox of educating in a 
pluralistic society. These three principles are: 1) the assertion 
of moral authority defines religion; 2) a position of moral au-
thority is a fundamental element of inculcative education; and 
3) censorship is inescapable in education, or in other words, 
moral neutrality is a myth. 
relevant to the curriculum, or better written, or when one of a host of other 
politically neutral reasons is present[;) these decisions obviously will not implicate 
First Amendment values."). 
106. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
107. Mobile County, 827 F.2d at 694. 
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1. Religion is defined by moral authority 
Religion involves the worship or admiration of that which is 
good. In defining that which is good, mankind has many differ-
ences. These differences translate into the world's many reli-
gions. The religious is differentiated from the moral by accredit-
ing some diety as the source of goodness. The moral merely con-
sists of that which is "of or relating to principles of right and 
wrong, conforming to a standard of right behavior." 108 Authority 
is defined in Barron's Legal Dictionary as, "the permission or 
power delegated to another." 109 Moral authority then, is the per-
mission, power, or right to say what is true or correct-to define 
the standard. As postmodern thought has further exposed, or 
possibly created, the pluralistic and relativistic nature of man 
and society, the power and authority to declare that which is 
moral has vanished. One may safely say what is truth for one's 
own self. No adult, however, can authoritatively decree that 
which is right or wrong for another adult outside of an under-
stood context. 110 Religion provides consenting groups of individ-
uals with a common context for interpreting right and wrong. 
In essence, traditional religion is the acceptance by an indi-
vidual of a moral authority posited outside of the self. For ex-
ample, the Catholic faith sets forth certain tenets, which consti-
tute assertions as to what is right and wrong. Those who accept 
these tenets may rightly be considered Catholics. They have 
chosen to give moral authority to the Catholic Church. The free-
dom to give moral authority to entities of one's own choosing is 
protected by the Constitution.m The Constitution's protection 
of religion is certainly not limited to the size of the organiza-
tion. Even small denominations or religious sects have their 
mode of worship protected by the Constitution. 
The dictionary defines a sect as, "a dissenting religious 
body, a religious denomination, or a group adhering to a distinc-
108. THE NEW MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 477 (1989). 
109. BARRON'S LEGAL DICTIONARY 36 (3'd ed. 1991). 
110. For example, a relationship, such as membership in a church, is created by 
mutual consent. Authority for that organization determines right and wrong within 
the context of that organization. However, the context of this life is beyond any 
unconsented controL At least, that is the presumption upon which the Bill of Rights 
is based. 
11 L Though this freedom is not present for all under the current public 
education system, it was intended for all Americans by Madison. See Part VI. Section 
A. infra. 
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tive doctrine or leader."112 A dissenting religious body is a group 
of individuals who have removed the moral authority from the 
denomination to which it was originally granted, and given it to 
a new entity. A second definition characterizes a religious de-
nomination by a particular world view. 113 The third definition 
involves granting moral authority to another individual or dis-
tinctive doctrineY4 Thus, a sect could be composed of a single 
individual who has given moral authority to a distinctive doc-
trine. 
The Constitution protects principles of religious freedom, so 
that all citizens may worship according to the dictates of their 
own conscience. 115 The Constitution, however, does not limit 
this principle by requiring the formation of a traditional church, 
a numerical minimum of believers, or even that the moral au-
thority be given to three letters ordered G-0-D. An athiest does 
not forfeit his or her constitutional rights when he or she can-
not or does not believe in God. 
Religion is the power or freedom to give personal recogni-
tion to a person, to a doctrine, or to an organization, of that per-
son's, that doctrine's, or that organization's authority to be or to 
say truth. Religion is by definition dispositive. Even that moral 
authority which asserts for itself that everyone's perspective is 
valid, invalidates all perspectives that claim dispositive truth. 
Moral authority is the answer to the question, "Who says?" As 
such, it is the defining element of religion. 
2. Secular humanism has moral authority 
"The public schools in this country are organized on the 
premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious 
teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal 
knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to 
religion," stated Justice Black in Everson. 116 While public edu-
cation has been justified in the past by this assumption, con-
112. Supra note 107, at 655. 
113. Id. 
114. ld. 
115. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) ("The solution to 
this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is 
jealously to guard the right of every individual to worship according to the dictates 
of conscience while requiring the government to maintain a course of neutrality 
among religions, and between religion and nonreligion"). 
116. Everson, 330 U.S. at 23-24. 
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flicts that have arisen over the last fifty years in teaching even 
basic subjects, such as science and history, provide evidence 
that this premise is simply not true. 117 Even basic science and 
history courses run into conflicts between belief systems claim-
ing authority for truth. 
In 1973, the Court began to face difficulties determining the 
line of separation between church and state with the Lemon 
test. In Committee For Public Education And Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, the Supreme Court clarified the neutrality prong. 118 
In Nyquist, a New York statute providing tax breaks to families 
whose children attended a nonpublic school was deemed to vio-
late the Establishment Clause. In four different opinions, the 
Justices came together just enough to clarify the neutrality 
prong. They modified it in Nyquist to mean, "the action in ques-
tion must ... have a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion." 119 In the field of education, where any one 
thing is taught to the exclusion of another, the possibility of 
neutrality is itself suspect. 120 
Assuming for the sake of argument that teaching from a 
purely secular perspective could lack moral authority, the 
child's time and mental energy are limited resources. The op-
portunity costs of a child expending those resources in learning 
from a source that (for the sake of argument) lacks moral au-
thority is the time and mental energy that could be applied in 
learning the religion and culture of his or her family. 121 Secular 
humanism has moral authority. 122 In other words, it declares 
truths. Because our society is pluralistic, it cannot tolerate the 
117. Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 Yale 
L.J. 515, 523-26 (1978) (teaching evolution in public schools undermines belief in 
many major religions). 
118. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); 
accord Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Louisiana statute mandating equal 
treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science is ruled unconstitutional); see 
also Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (1979). 
119. Id. at 773. 
120. Supra note 116. 
121. "The cost of choosing to use resources [such as time or money] for one 
purpose ... [sacrifices other] alternatives[s] for using those resources." DAVID H. 
HYMAN, ECONOMICS 14 (2d. Instructor's Ed. 1992). Furthermore, when we "allow [state 
mechanisms] to decide who can best provide a child intellectual stimulation [we] [] 
chill the propagation and perpetuation of disfavored political, philosophical, and 
religious views." In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1376 (Utah 1982). 
122. ARONS AND LAURENCE, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First 
Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 Harv. C.R. C.L.L. Rev. 309, 316-317 (1980). Cf. 
The Humanist Manifesto II, 33 HUMANIST 4-10 (Sept. - Nov. 1978). 
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government's use of secular humanism in dominating the 
teaching of its youth anymore than it could tolerate a state 
church. 
Public education is based on the premise that secular teach-
ing can lack moral authority. This premise, however, is flawed. 
Inculcative teaching must contain a source of moral authority, 
for at the moment education becomes divested of moral author-
ity, it loses its capacity to teach. 
3. The position of moral authority inherent in education 
Three traditional ideas regarding the government's proper 
role in education posit moral authority in different places. Amy 
Gutmann termed these three ideas as "the family state," "the 
state of families," and "the state of individuals." 123 In the family 
state, moral authority is given exclusively to the government. 124 
In the state of families, moral authority is given exclusively to 
the parents. 125 The state of individuals simply denies the right 
of parents or government to choose what moral authority will 
shape a child's development. 126 Jonathan Marks remarks con-
cerning Gutmann's analysis, "[t]he problem remains: education 
cannot and should not be morally neutral." 127 
Two basic functions occur in the process of inculcative edu-
cation. First, the learning individual accepts that the teacher 
will provide accurate and meaningful knowledge. Second, the 
teacher determines what will be provided as accurate and 
meaningful knowledge. The first function deals with the loca-
tion of moral authority. The second deals with the censoring 
effect moral authority has in educating. 
Inculcative education requires the simple submission of an 
individual to an accepted authority. In effect, a position of 
moral authority determines what is to be taught and how. 
Inculcative education contains moral authority passing on its 
discernment. In other words, a censorship which a student has 
voluntarily accepted. 
123. GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 22. 
124. Id. at 22-28. 
125. !d. at 28-33. 
126. Id. at 33-41. 
127. Jonathan Marks, Amy Gutmann's Democratic Education, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
1140 (1988) (book review). 
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Plato wrote, "The first thing will be to establish a censor-
ship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale 
of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire 
mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones 
only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales[.]" 128 Plato en-
visioned what would clearly be a "family state" according to 
Gutmann's classifications. This quote, however, illustrates well 
the censorship inherent in education. The process of developing 
a curriculum involves the passing on of discernment in the form 
of what information is deemed worthwhile, or in Plato's view, 
"establishing a censorship."129 When this concept is combined 
with the realization that any perspective is to some extent fic-
tion, then the truth of substantive relativism in a pluralistic 
society comes to light. Any position attempting to assert author-
ity can only assert a subjective authority and not an objective 
truth. 130 
Authority to control information must be asserted in order 
to educate. 131 Efforts by the government to control the informa-
tion that teachers would have selected to teach, or in other 
words, to free the student from the teachers' censoring, does not 
free a student from censorship. Censorship may not be censored 
without simply recreating the location at which the censorship 
occurs. Academic freedom is not challenged by censorship. The 
absence of a teacher's freedom to censor challenges academic 
freedom. Censorship is an inevitable aspect of education. The 
question is where the censorship lies, and who gets to deter-
mine that line. The fight within education is the same fight 
that divided the people in the days of Madison: Who gets the 
requisite moral authority to determine what is relevant, what it 
true? 
128. PLATO, REPUBLIC, 62 (B. Jowett trans., Dolphin Books ed. 1960). 
129. Jd. 
130. The exception to this rule arises through the development of organizations. 
Truth can be objectively determined within the declared value system of a particular 
organization. 
131. The attempt at teaching objective truth in a pluralistic society which 
possesses a wide variety of values and many positions of moral authority opens one 
up to charges of censorship, blasphemy, or superstitim. Teaching inherently includes 
a degree of censorship. Inculcative teaching involves the passing on of valued 
information from some authoritative position to be accepted as truth. Even analytic 
teaching involves a censorship. The difference in analytic teaching is that the 
students, being sufficiently informed of choices, choose their own particular position 
to accept as authoritative. They may even, as with secular humanism, set themselves 
up as authoritative. 
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B. Citrus Gone Sour: The Lemon Test 
There is no need to investigate beyond Mobile County to un-
cover the failings of the Lemon test. The functionality of the 
Lemon test should have been placed on trial by the issues 
raised in Mobile County. To adequately address the complaint 
brought forth in Mobile County, a court must define religious 
belief and it must adopt a disinterested test to measure the con-
stitutionality of the textbooks. The court refused to define reli-
gious belief and the test it used was based on the very principle 
[the religiosity of secularism] that was at issue. 
1. Judicial malpractice 
The Eleventh Circuit Court begins the discussion in Mobile 
County by noting that, "the Supreme Court has never estab-
lished a comprehensive test for determining the 'delicate ques-
tion' of what constitutes a religious belief for purposes of the 
First Amendment." 132 From the very first paragraph of the dis-
cussion, the Eleventh Circuit had no intention of trying to de-
fine religion. Yet, determining what is religious, and therefore 
protected by the First Amendment, is the substantive issue of 
Mobile County. The court continues, "we need not attempt to do 
so [define a religious belief] in this case[.]"133 
The plaintiffs allege that secularism is a religion. The 
court's neglecting to establish a legal definition of religion pre-
vents that charge from ever receiving a hearing. The court 
writes, "The effect prong [of the Lemon test] asks whether, irre-
spective of government's actual purpose, the practice under re-
view in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disap-
proval."134 If government identification with religion conveys 
such a message of government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion, then "a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is 
violated." 135 Because the court still has no usable definition of 
religion, the court simply adjudicates the case as if secularism 
were a religion. But the plaintiff's charge that secularism is a 
religion. If there is judicial malpractice, applying a test of secu-
132. Mobile County, 827 F.2d at 689. 
133. Id. 
134. Jaffree, 472 U.S. n. 42 at 56; quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. 
135. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389. 
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larism to determine whether a religion of secularism (secular 
humanism) is sufficiently secular would certainly qualify. 
The court's test should not be the "secular nature" of the 
textbooks. If secularism is a religion, then by substitution, the 
court's opinion reads, "[f]ocus exclusively on the secular (substi-
tuting secular for religious) component of any activity would 
inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment 
Clause." 136 Clearly, if secularism is a religion, the court has 
made a stark endorsement for the religion of secular human-
ism. Continuing with the substitution, the courts explanation 
reads, "[r]ather, the message conveyed is one of a governmental 
attempt to instill in Alabama public school children such values 
as independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, 
maturity, self-reliance and logical decision-making. This is an 
entirely appropriate (substitute religious for secular) effect."137 
Recall Scalia's dissent referring to the Lemon test as a monster. 
How was this little monster ever formed? Perhaps the devil is 
its father. Of course, I refer to a purely secular devil that wears 
all-red superman suits and carries a full-size fork. 
How can a charge incriminating secular humanism as a reli-
gion be resolved with the second prong of the Lemon test? By 
charging that secularism is a religion, the complaint accuses 
the test itself of being in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
The Lemon test was not a problem for the court to overcome, 
rather it was the court's method of reaching the conclusion it 
desired while sidestepping difficult issues. 138 
The problem for the Eleventh Circuit Court came from the 
implications of logical conclusions. If secular humanism is a 
religion, virtually nothing requiring a position of moral author-
ity could be taught in a public school without violating the Es-
tablishment Clause. Although the court in Mobile County at-
tempted to escape this conclusion, the nature of moral authority 
sheds light on why this conclusion holds true. If secular human-
ism is not a religion, then the court has established a position of 
moral authority that is in direct opposition to theistic religion. 
When the court decided that it would, for the purposes of this 
136. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-80. 
137. Mobile County, 827 F.2d at 692. 
138. Recall Scalia's dissent in Lamb's Chapel, supra note 68 and accompanying 
text. 
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trial, treat secular humanism as a religion, it backed itself into 
a corner. 
2. Endorsement of religion 
The court employed a clever twist on Lynch-ian principals in 
the way it treated secular humanism as a religion. In Lynch, 
the Supreme Court ruled that an impermissible advancement of 
religion must amount to an endorsement of religion. 139 Ironi-
cally, the very case the district court used to find a violation of 
the Establishment Clause is now applied by the circuit court to 
determine the absence of any violation. The circuit court states, 
"[the] mere consistency with religious tenets is insufficient to 
constitute unconstitutional advancement of religion." 140 Thus, 
just because secular humanism is secular does not mean that 
the secular nature of the textbooks advances secular human-
ism. However, as clever as this analysis may be, it misses the 
central characteristic of how a religion is endorsed. 
The court noted, "[i]t is true that the textbooks contain 
ideas that are consistent with secular humanism; the textbooks 
also contain ideas consistent with theistic religion." 141 In fact, 
the textbooks provided a list of ideas which were consistent 
with both. 142 The court failed to recognize, however, that it is 
not the number of commonalities that determines whether or 
not a religion is being endorsed. Whether a religion is endorsed 
is determined by the source that is accredited with providing 
meaning to those ideas. 143 The district court attempted to illus-
trate this distinction with its argument that "if, in so doing it 
[the State] advances a reason for the rule, the possible different 
reasons must be explained evenhandedly." It concluded that 
"the state may not promote one particular reason over another 
in the public schools." 
139. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681. 
140. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107 (quoting Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 
495, 505 (1952) ("The state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all 
religions from views distasteful to them"). 
141. Mobile County, 827 F.2d at 692. 
142. Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. at 988. 
143. For example, a textbook may teach that smoking is bad without endorsing 
Mormonism. However, when a textbook instructs that smoking is bad because a 
Mormon prophet said that God said so, then the textbook has accredited a specific 
source with the meaning to those ideas. 
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From a Christian perspective, neutrality is not even a 
possibility. Christ said, "He that is not with me is against me; 
and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad." 144 What 
does it mean to be with Christ from a Christian perspective? 
Christ said, "I seek not my own will, but the will of the Fa-
ther." 145 In the Lord's Prayer, he prayed, "Thy will be done in 
earth, as it is in heaven ... For thine is the kingdom, and the 
power, and the glory, for ever. Amen." 146 In other words, a 
Christian seeks two things: one, to do the will of the Father on 
this earth; and two, to give God the honor and the credit in ev-
erything. Those who do not give God the credit are not with 
Christ and such an individual, "scattereth abroad." 147 
This principal is understood by Jonathan Marks in his book 
review of Democratic Education. He writes, "Neutrality among 
virtues is itself controversial. Indifference among virtues of-
fends supporters of moral education as much as instruction in 
only one view of the good life represses those who favor a differ-
ent view ."148 The court clearly should have realized that neu-
trality is impossible when choosing between positions of 
dispositive moral authority. 
Now that local government is tied by the 14th Amendment to 
the Constitution, Jefferson's model of public education clearly 
violates First Amendment freedoms. Madison's solution to plu-
ralism, however, if applied provides general education without 
violating constitutional rights. 
VI. MADISON'S SOLUTION APPLIED TO EDUCATION 
Current educational practices are based on a Jeffersonian 
model. 149 Contrasting the oppressive destination of Jefferson's 
vision of public education with the freedoms gained by applying 
Madisonian principles to education emphasizes the consistency 
and constitutional harmony that would be gained by separating 
government from education. 
144. Matthew 12:30 (King James). 
145. John 5:30 (King James). 
146. Matthew 6:10-13 (King James). 
147. Supra note 144. 
148. Marks, supra note 127. 
149. Supra note 15. 
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A Madison's Freedom of Conscience 
Because the Madisonian solution is not even possible with-
out individual freedom of conscience, Madison fought zealously 
for a supreme protection for individual conscience. This zeal is 
manifest in Madison's lifelong advocacy of free press, religion, 
and education. 150 
Neal Riemer said that in Madison's treatment of pluralism in a 
democracy he achieved "a creative breakthrough to the di-
lemma of pluralism, a successful resolution of a troubling prob-
lem."151 In Madison's days, conventional wisdom knew there 
could only be one true faith and that it was the duty of the ruler 
to uphold that faith. 152 Madison's problem was simply how to 
reconcile the condition of religious diversity with these two 
propositions. "There is only one true faith," every group said, 
"and it's ours!"153 
The attempt to reconcile liberty and authority drove Madi-
son and his politics until his death. This is evidenced by his 
efforts in the creation and ratification of the Constitution. This 
is also evidenced by Madison's politics in the early years of the 
Republic. In his letters and speeches refuting Calhoun's theory, 
Madison illustrated that Calhoun's theory contained only two 
logical consequences, anarchy or tyranny. 154 In other words, 
Madison reasserted freedom in politics by diminishing control 
of any specific faction. 
Is a bill of rights a security for religion? Would the bill of 
rights in this state exempt the people from paying for the sup-
port of one particular sect, if such a sect were exclusively es-
tablished by law? If there were a majority of one sect, a bill of 
rights would be a poor protection for liberty .... This freedom 
arises from the multiplicity of sects which pervades America, 
and which is the best and only security for religious liberty in 
any society. 155 
150. For Madison, "free" would have meant a separation from governmental 
involvement, not a negligible price tag. 
151. NEAL RIEMER, cited in THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 
(Kenneth W. Thompsen ed., 1990). 
152. Id. at 5, n. 40. 
153. Id. at 6. 
154. Id. at 10. 
155. ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 157 
(Kenneth W. Thompsen ed., 1990). See also note 7, PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 11:130. 
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B. Two Paths to Freedom 
The principle difference between Jeffersonian and 
Madisonian models in the area of education arises in the way 
they view the path to freedom. For Jefferson, the path is re-
stricted in order to preserve wisdom and virtue. For Madison, 
the path must be free, even though that freedom risks a loss in 
virtue. Jefferson's censorship lines are determined by the state 
in order to develop individuals to perpetuate freedom. Madi-
son's lines of censorship are determined freely by faction in or-
der that the government be perpetuated free of tyranny. 
1. Jefferson's Model of Education 
Jefferson's revolutionary perspective regarding education 
leads to extensive and potentially Orwellian power placed in 
the government. Over the last century, Jefferson's ideas on edu-
cation have been cited and followed. Both his concern for uni-
versal education and advocacy of educating for autonomy are 
based on the premise that this type of education increases the 
liberty and happiness of the people as a whole. Madisonian 
ideas on education do not differ. However, in Jefferson's model 
for achieving these ends, the necessity of education has a 
deeper and more troubling purpose. He believed with other 
founders that public education was a necessary part of govern-
ment in order to sustain the republic. 
As for the future, they did not propose to leave it to chance ... 
Concern with reforming the American public to ensure that it 
would contain an ample supply of virtuous men in the future 
had, of course, occupied the Patriot constitution makers, who 
had provided for educational and religious institutions that 
were designed to inculcate virtue. 156 
Jefferson believed that schools were, "the ultimate check on 
the checks and balances in republican constitutions." 157 If edu-
156. HAROLD HELLENBRAND, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: EDUCATION AND 
POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 190-91 
157. ld. 
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cation is indeed the "ultimate check," it seems somewhat incon-
sistent and dangerous to place this check in the hands of the 
very government on which it is, at least theoretically, a check 
and a balance. Because Jefferson's ideas on education are for 
the maintenance of the state, personal liberties are much sacri-
ficed on the way to personal autonomy.158 Concerning educating 
for autonomy, Blustein wrote, "Although children and youths 
could not be granted complete autonomy before they came of 
age, educators had to nurture a 'self-critical ability,' so that the 
next generation could gain the freedom, not to break away com-
pletely, but rather to agree wilfully with their elders' basic prin-
ciples."159 Blustein's ideas conform closely with Jefferson's. His 
revolution wasn't so much a change in the nature of the order 
as it was a change on how the cream got to the top. Waggoner 
writes, "most importantly, Jefferson hoped the establishment of 
a system of public schools, as proposed in the bill, (Toward the 
General Diffusion of Knowledge), would elevate the mass of 
people to the moral status necessary to insure good government 
and public safety and happiness."160 Jefferson believed that in 
order to guarantee a republican form of government, the gov-
ernment would, of necessity, be required to take on the duty to 
educate the populace. 
However, free governments, by their very commitment to 
freedom, cannot guarantee perpetuation. If the democratic gov-
ernment has a duty to educate the populace, the rationale is 
that this duty is for the people to be better able to participate in 
the legislative process. However, to control the education of 
those participating in the legislative process, the government 
would clearly also have to control the media. 161 When a free 
government ensures goodness, safety, perpetuation, and happi-
ness, it does so only at the expense of the freedom to be bad, 
dangerous, and miserable. Helle brand noted this irony in Jeffer-
son's educational ideas when he wrote, "Always suspicious of 
government's tendency to usurp people's prerogatives, Jefferson 
nonetheless championed schools and social legislation that 
158. Ironic that the man who penned the phrase, "government by the people," 
espoused ideas that, when followed to their logical conclusion, over time actually lead 
to a people by the government, especially with the Fourteenth Amendment in place. 
159. BLOSTEIN, supra note 21, at 132. 
160. WAGGONER, supra note 13, at 23. 
161. This obvious First Amendment violation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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sought to impress on the minds and hearts of Virginia the 
stamp of his own peculiar strain of republicanism." 162 
2. The Madisonian Solution 
In forming the Union, Madison and the framers faced a par-
adox previously unsolved in the governments of the world. To 
control the force of a powerful faction requires that some 
greater power be posited in a checking entity. What then was to 
check the control of the greater power? The world had not de-
veloped a system to avoid oppression from one of two extremes: 
on the one, that individual rights were easily abused in the an-
archy of weak government; on the other, that in retaining 
power sufficient to control competing interests, government 
became tyrannical in the absoluteness of its power. The great 
American solution advocated by Madison presented a method of 
countering power, not with greater power, but with power dis-
persed sufficiently to pre-empt the possibility of power suffi-
cient to control others. The threat of having one central entity 
possessing power to control the exercise of individual develop-
ment was bypassed by the dispersing of that power to as many 
units of opinion that the people cared to assert. 
Applying Madison's solution to education reveals how a plu-
rality of interests in education can be validated without infring-
ing on constitutional rights. Madison began by defining "fac-
tion." "By faction I understand a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are 
united or actuated by some common impulse of passion or of 
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma-
nent or aggregate interests of the whole." 163 
Applying Madison's working definition of faction to educa-
tion, society is divided into a number of factions regarding 
choice of curriculum, standards, and methods of teaching. Mad-
ison continued, "There are two methods of curing the mischiefs 
of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by control-
ling its effects. There are again two methods of removing causes 
of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential 
162. HELLEBRAND, supra note 11, at 13. In other words, Jefferson, in principle 
at least was foreshadowing the famous revolutionary maxim of Fidel Castro, "within 
the revolution, everything; against the revolution, nothing." (quoting GREGORY H. Fox 
AND GEORGE NOLTE, Responses, 37 Harv. lnt'l L.J. 231, 236. 
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same 
opinions, the same passions, and the same interests." 161 
The modern method of public education, or Jeffersonian 
model, attempts to cure causes of faction by standardizing edu-
cation. The standard has been formed by the Lemon test. Cur-
rently, it is dictated by secular humanism. This model has de-
stroyed the liberty essential to the existence of factions and dif-
ferences by replacing individual choice with a government stan-
dard. Secular humanism and its political correctness provides a 
standard of opinions, feelings, and values which public schools 
attempt to inculcate into the citizenry from childhood. 
Madison dismisses the first method, of controlling faction 
with a greater powered faction, as counterproductive in that the 
liberty for the greatest faction (the state) is only obtained 
through the loss of freedom for lesser factions (groups of par-
ents with common values). Madison dismisses the second 
method, of developing a consensus and uniformity, as unrealis-
tic. Even Orwell's Big Brother State could never stamp into hu-
manity the same opinions, passions, interests, and agendas. 165 
3. Of Evil Bedfellows 
This essay does not aim to find fault with the intentions of 
the judiciary. After all, can it really be evil to desire the educa-
tion and happiness of everyone, even for all the children? Yes. 
When the process by which that dream is pursued violates the 
principles by which that dream exists, the benevolence of a nice 
government does nothing to ease the violence to freedom. The 
good intentions of the courts do not alleviate the type of consti-
tutional violations currently perpetuated by public schooling. 
Freedom is not a result or destination. It is in the journey. It is 
the agency of man, preserved in its independence, only curbed 
by the state when choices would harm third parties. The lack of 
individual choice in the educational processes designed by 
"nice" governments and "mean" governments differs only 
slightly, if at all. The following examples have four common 
goals: I) they advocate free education; 2) they advocate compul-
164. !d. 
165. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). However, it should be noted that the 
government in that novel did set up a system to try. That system did succeed on 
specific individuals. 
69] THE LEMON TEST 105 
sory education; 3) they advocate state provided education; and 
4) they recognize the role of education in providing the child 
with the desired cultural values. 
Adolph Hitler wrote: 
It is of paramount interest to the state and the nation to pre-
vent these ['splendid people"] from falling into the hands of 
bad, ignorant, or even vicious educators. The state, therefore, 
has the duty of watching over their education and preventing 
any mischief ... .it must not let itself be ... talked into ne-
glecting its duty and denying the nation the food which it 
needs and which is good for it; with ruthless determination it 
must make sure of this instrument of popular education, and 
place it in the service of the state and the nation. 166 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote: 
Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of chil-
dren by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty. 
But, you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, 
when we replace home education by social [education]. 
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about 
the hallowed co-relation of parent and child . . . [is] 
disgusting .... 
The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by 
degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all in-
struments of production in the hands of the state .... 
[I]n the most advanced countries the following [methods] will 
be found pretty generally applicable: [ten items listed] .... 
10. Free education for all children in public schools .... 167 
166. ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 242 (Ralph Manheim trans., Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 1971) (1925) (Incidently, page 426 contains the passage, "Science, too, must be 
regarded by the folkish state as an instrument for the advancement of national 
pride. . . ."); cited in Comment, "People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to 
Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment," 1996 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 244 n.209 (vol. 1). 
167. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 33-34, 39-40 
(Paul M. Sweezy trans., Modern Readers Paperback 1968) (1952); cited in Comment, 
"People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right 
Under the Ninth Amendment," 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 245 n.211 (vol. 1). 
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Saddam Hussein wrote, 
[W]e find it inadequate to give the young the same kind of 
general attention given to society at large. To enable our 
youth to participate actively in the transformation process, we 
must ... allocate for them a special programme in addition to 
the general one .... With the correct fashioning of our youth 
as a result of this approach, we shall safeguard the future and 
ensure [their] full utilization ... in the service of the revolu-
tionary aims. 168 
He wrote that because, "youth have no social awareness or 
political affinities ... the Party and the State should be their 
family, their father and mother."' 169 Daniel Witte comments, 
"Saddam Hussein implemented his philosophy by enacting 
'laws for ... compulsory education."' 170 
Of course, it was our own Justice Warren who wrote, 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance 
laws and the great expenditures for education both demon-
strate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is 
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural val-
ues .. _171 
Surely our democratic government reflects cultural values. 
It must never, however, be given the power to define and stan-
168. SADDAM HUSSEIN, SOCIAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN IRAQ 55-61 (Khalid 
Kishtainy trans., 1979) (1976); cited in Comment, "People v. Bennett: Analytic 
Approaches to Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth 
Amendment," 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 246-47 n.212 (vol. 1). 
169. EFRAIM KARSH & lNARI RAUTSI, SADDAM HUSSEIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 
176-77 (1991) (footnote omitted); cited in Comment, "People v. Bennett: Analytic 
Approaches to Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth 
Amendment," 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 247 n.212 (vol. 1). 
170. Comment, "People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a 
Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendmen4" 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 
247 n.212 (vol. 1). 
171. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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dardize those cultural values. Madison notes that the diversity 
of opinion, passion, and interest is the mainstay of the demo-
cratic republic. He did not note uniformity or standardization 
as having any such virtue. He wrote, "The diversities in the 
faculties of men ... is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uni-
formity of interests. The protection of these [diverse] faculties is 
the first object of government."172 Madison thus concludes that 
the cause of faction cannot be removed, and still preserve free-
dom. This conclusion mirrors the necessary condition of censor-
ship in education. Once the existence of faction and the pres-
ence of censorship are accepted, the proper management of 
their strengths becomes the purpose of government. Because 
government cannot decree what aspects of faction or censorship 
are positive or negative, it must only provide structure that al-
lows the citizenry to determine what faction and line of censor-
ship are positive. Government must also avoid the prevention of 
faction; it cannot determine the educating lines of censorship. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Education is vital to the perpetuation of a free state. Sepa-
ration of religion from government is likewise vital to condi-
tions of freedom. The failure of the early developers of general 
education to understand the connection between religion and 
education contributed to the rise of public education. Public 
education has become a special case for the courts. The courts 
have repeatedly carved out constitutional exceptions to keep 
the system running. Although the courts have tried to balance 
conflicting interests, it is an exercise in futility. Nearly the en-
tire Bill of Rights has been suspended for the purpose of main-
taining public schools. 
The courts have used the Lemon test to minimize the effects 
of the violations of fundamental rights that occur in public edu-
cation. However, over the years it has become increasingly in-
adequate. Mobile County put the Lemon test on trial. Using a 
test based on secularism to measure the religious nature of sec-
ularism puts juice on a wound from which many are already 
bleeding constitutional rights. Faced with the dilemma of end-
ing public education, the court evaded the issues. 
172. Supra note 162. 
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The process of education gives an individual a voice, a set of 
beliefs, and an understanding of the multitude of other voices 
with equal claim to choice. Through this process, education fa-
cilitates the individual's passing from dependence through inde-
pendence to autonomy and interdependence. The process by 
which beliefs, terministic screens, and cultural values are de-
veloped must not be under the responsibility and control of gov-
ernment. 
Censoring education will be provided. This will occur, be it 
on the street, by parents, by private schools, or by religious 
schools. It will declare truths and credit some authority for 
those truths. The credit must go somewhere. Secular humanism 
merely relocates the moral authority from some theistic Su-
preme to the cumulative thoughts and ideas of man. Many indi-
viduals will surely choose a school teaching from that perspec-
tive. However, this cannot be the standard. The central pur-
pose of Madison's solution provides power sufficient to protect 
an individual's freedom of conscience without creating power 
great enough to destroy the individual's freedom of conscience. 
Madison's basic theories concerning freedom of religion locate 
the decision making power in the hands of the smallest possible 
individual unit. They illustrate which educational philosophies 
secure the protections embodied in the Constitution. 
A religious belief is that which contains moral authority. 
Religious beliefs can be protected in education by (voucher sys-
tem) retaining within the family as much choice as possible. 
Can a system be developed that maximizes the educational op-
portunities for children while minimizing individual loss of 
choice? 
The answer lies with understanding moral authority in a 
pluralistic society. 173 
Thomas Maruan Slwusen 
173. Moral authority is the answer to the question, "Who says?" The answer 
really doesn't matter because there is no way of proving that which in actuality is 
a choice. Nor is this answer relevant. Who gets to answer that question'/ The answer 
to that is vital. The answer is clearly, unequivocally, any living individual ... and 
never, never, never, never any government. 
